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In this paper we use micro-level data on employers and employees to investigate whether
Affirmative Action procedures lead firms to hire minority or female employees who are less qualified
than workers who might otherwise be hired. Our measures of qualifications include the educational
attainment of the workers hired (both absolute and relative to job requirements), skill requirements of
the job into which they are hired, and a variety of outcome measures that are presumably related to
worker performance on the job. The analysis is based on a representative sample of over 3,200
employers in four major metropolitan areas in the United States. Our results show some evidence of
lower educational qualifications among blacks and Hispanics hired under Affirmative Action, but not
among white women. Further, our results show little evidence of substantially weaker job performance
among most groups of minority and female Affirmative Action hires.      In these data, much hinges on the wording of questions describing Affirmative Action; references to “quotas”
1
or “reverse discrimination” generally elicit the most negative responses. There is also some evidence of more
tolerance for compensatory policies in education than in employment, though quotas or other forms of preferences
in university admissions are still widely opposed. For a view that distinguishes Affirmative Action in universities
from that in employment see Carter (1991).
      Critics of current Affirmative Action policies that stress both inefficiencies and inequities (from violating
2
principles of rewards based on individual merit) include Glazer (1975), Epstein (1992) and Sowell (1990). Coate
and Loury (1993) argue that Affirmative Action can reduce the incentives of “preferred” groups to invest in
human capital formation, while Carter (1991) also emphasizes the stigma borne by qualified minorities because of
these policies.
      Evidence of discrimination against minorities or women, even when controlling for observable credentials,
3
can be found in several recent “audit” studies of employers (e.g., Fix and Struyk, 1994; Neumark, forthcoming),
in which matched pairs of applicants with comparable credentials but differing race/gender are sent out to apply
for specific jobs.
Are Affirmative Action Hires Less Qualified?
Evidence from Employer-Employee Data on New Hires
I. INTRODUCTION
Affirmative Action policies have always been controversial, largely because of the allegation
that they cause employers (and universities) to prefer less-qualified minorities or women over more-
qualified white men. Survey evidence suggests that, even among whites, there is widespread public
support for outlawing employment discrimination and also for policies that compensate the past victims
of discrimination through targeted education, job training, and recruitment efforts. At the same time,
policies that give “preference” in employment or university admissions to less-qualified members of
these groups are strongly opposed (e.g., Lipset and Schneider, 1978; Bobo and Smith, 1994).
1
Similarly, many critics of Affirmative Action policies support strong enforcement of Equal
Employment Opportunity (EEO) laws and even compensatory recruitment and training, but argue that
the alleged preferences for less-qualified minorities and women in most current Affirmative Action
practices create labor market inefficiencies and/or inequities.  In contrast, proponents of Affirmative
2
Action policies frequently argue that labor market discrimination continues to be prevalent, despite
EEO laws.  They also argue that gaps in the relative qualifications of different groups (when measured
32
      For instance, Bergmann (1989) stresses that occupation-specific experience requirements effectively
4
discriminate against women who have been barred from gaining such experience because of occupational
segregation by gender.
      The difficulty of predicting or observing individual-level productivity has been stressed in the “statistical
5
discrimination” literature (e.g., Cain, 1986), and more recently by Oettinger (1996) and Altonji and Pierret
(1996). The question of whether required qualifications accurately predict job performance, and whether any
resulting “disparate impacts” across demographic groups can be considered discrimination, has been addressed in
a variety of court cases (e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power in 1971 and Ward Cove v. Atonio in 1989) and in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. The debate over the latter, including the allegations of critics that such legislation constituted
a “quota bill,” indicates the difficulties of distinguishing strong EEO policies from preferential treatment.
      Most of Leonard’s papers deal with the effects of Affirmative Action on relative employment, occupational
6
status, and the like. These are reviewed in various survey papers by Leonard (1989, 1990).
      Given the small effects of Affirmative Action on the overall composition of employment that Leonard shows
7
in his other work, it is very unlikely that he would find strong effects on productivity at the two-digit industry
level.
by educational attainment, experience, etc.) likely reflect past or current discrimination,  and that such
4
qualifications are weak predictors of actual performance on the job (which itself may be difficult to
measure, especially in the short term).  In this view, the efficiency costs of preferential policies are
5
considered very small or even negative (since these policies might actually lead to the hiring of more
productive minorities and women).
The current debate on Affirmative Action thus turns heavily on the existence and empirical
magnitudes of shortfalls in qualifications and job performance of women and minorities hired under
Affirmative Action. Despite the intensity of the viewpoints held, the evidence to date on this issue
remains quite thin. To the best of our knowledge, the only systematic empirical study of the effects of
Affirmative Action on productivity in employment is that of Jonathan Leonard (1984).  He estimates
6
production functions using state-by-two-digit industry data in manufacturing, in which the fractions of
employment accounted for by minorities/women and by federal contractors (who are typically required
to have Affirmative Action plans) appear as independent variables. But the usefulness of this approach
is limited by the highly aggregated nature of the data and its focus only on manufacturing.  Also,
7
Badgett (1995) provides more qualitative evidence on the effects of Affirmative Action on the3
      Regarding college admissions, Loury and Garman (1995) and Kane (1995) present evidence of gaps in SAT
8
scores between white and black college students to infer the effects of Affirmative Action on college admissions.
The former study suggests that preferential admissions policies lead blacks with low test scores to attend (and
frequently drop out from) colleges with higher average test scores. The latter suggests that these results mostly
reflect differences in high school performance and family background rather than preferential admissions for
blacks.
      The survey is part of a broader project known as the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, which consists of
9
household surveys and an in-depth, qualitative study of a smaller sample of employers in each of these four
metropolitan areas. The project has been financed by the Ford and Russell Sage Foundations (Holzer, 1996a).
These data are also used in Holzer (1995 and 1996b).
qualifications of minority hires from a case study of a large manufacturing firm, and concludes that—at
this company—Affirmative Action did not result in lower-quality hires, based in part on evidence that
upper-level management promoted Affirmative Action as a means of finding the best employees.
8
In this paper, we provide what we believe to be the first micro-level empirical evidence on the
relative qualifications of workers hired under Affirmative Action. Using data on new hires collected
from employers, we are able to compare the qualifications of women or minorities hired under
Affirmative Action to those of white men in comparable jobs, and to those of women or minorities
hired in firms that do not use Affirmative Action. Of course, workers’ qualifications and performance
are difficult to measure. We therefore take a broad-ranging approach, focusing on a wide variety of
variables related to both initial qualifications as well as performance on the job.
II. THE DATA
The Sample
The data are drawn from a survey that was administered to 800 employers in each of four
metropolitan areas: Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles.  The survey was administered between
94
      The survey was administered to firms in Detroit between June 1992 and February 1993; it was administered
10
in the other areas between March 1993 and May 1994. The timing was deliberately chosen in order to coordinate
with the surveying of households in each area, as part of the Multi-City study described above. Monthly
unemployment rates averaged under 6 percent in Atlanta and Boston during the survey period; in Detroit and Los
Angeles they averaged roughly 8 percent and under 10 percent, respectively, during the relevant periods. Dummy
variables for metropolitan area and year of survey are included in the multivariate analyses that follow to control
for these differences in local labor market conditions.
      The SSI listings are drawn primarily from local phone directories that are supplemented by other sources. For
11
another example of employer data drawn from SSI listings, see Barron et al. (1994).
      Most characteristics of workers and jobs do not differ significantly across the samples of firms generated by
12
the two data sources.
June 1992 and May 1994, as the national economy was recovering from the recession of the early
1990s.
10
The survey was administered over the phone, and averaged roughly 35 minutes in length. The
sample of firms was drawn from two sources: (1) a listing of firms and their phone numbers provided
by Survey Sampling, Inc. (SSI); and (2) the employers of respondents in the household surveys that
were also administered in each of these four metropolitan areas.  The latter were drawn in order to
11
generate a sample of “matched pairs” of individuals and employers. For the firms in the SSI part of the
sample, the respondent to the survey is the person who is responsible for hiring non-college-educated
workers. For the sample drawn from the household survey, the respondent is the person responsible for
hiring into the occupation of the household respondent.
12
A number of steps were taken to ensure that the data could be used to draw inferences
regarding the underlying population. Sample weights were generated to account for any differences in
firm characteristics that might be attributable to these different sampling strategies, so that we can pool
data from these two sources. Despite the differences between these two sources, both were designed to
generate employee-weighted samples of firms. For the SSI sample, this was accomplished by ex ante
stratification of the sample based on establishment size, the distribution of firms being chosen to5
      The stratification scheme was: 25 percent in establishments with fewer than 20 employees; 50 percent in
13
establishments with 20–99 employees; and 25 percent in those with 100 or more employees. These distributions
were drawn from a weighted sample of firms in the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) of 1980 and
1982.
      Sample weights are applied to the household-generated firms that adjust for: (1) the underrepresentation of
14
jobs requiring college, since the SSI sample focused on noncollege jobs; (2) the oversampling of low-income and
minority residents in the household surveys; and (3) the incompleteness of the Boston and Los Angeles samples
of households from which employers were drawn. More information on the construction of these weights is
available from the authors.
      The lack of extra weighting for high-turnover firms seems appropriate, since a single job that turns over
15
frequently is only available to a single worker at any time. Unfortunately, there was no easy way to put extra
weight on firms whose rate of hiring is temporarily high due to their net employment growth.
      Successfully screened firms were those where the correct firm and the person responsible for new hiring into
16
the relevant types of positions were contacted, and where the firm had hired someone in the past three years into
one of those positions.
      For more details see Holzer (1996a). Only response rates among firms in construction and in the smallest
17
size category were significantly lower than others, while those in the public sector and the largest establishments
were significantly higher. But response rates were within .10 of the mean (.67) in all of these categories.
approximate the distribution of employees across size categories in the workforce.  For the household-
13
generated sample, the distribution of firms should approximate the distribution of employment in the
population by construction (at least when sample-weighted). Thus, no additional size-weighting of
firms is necessary with this sample.  When focusing on the characteristics of each firm’s most recently
14
filled job, the sample will provide extra weight to firms that do a lot of hiring because of their size (but
not because of high turnover).  The sample of new jobs should thus reasonably approximate the
15
available stock of jobs.
The overall response rate for the survey was roughly 67 percent for firms that were successfully
screened.  This response rate compares quite favorably with other surveys of employers administered
16
over the phone (e.g., Kling, 1995). In addition, because we have some measured characteristics of firms
in the SSI sample that did not respond to the survey (i.e., establishment size, industry, and location), we
could check for differences in response rates across these observable categories that might generate
sample selection bias. Few significant differences were found in response rates across the categories
measured by these variables.
176
      The published data show that jobs in retail trade, the services, and manufacturing account for .17–.21,
18
.31–.40, and .13–.24 of total employment in these areas. The distribution of employment across industries in the
survey is very comparable to these figures.
      For instance, the new hires contain fewer white males (.26 vs. .32), more blacks, (.20 vs. .17), and more
19
blue-collar workers (.35 vs. .26) than do all current employees.
      Lower qualifications or performance are more likely when Affirmative Action is used in hiring rather than in
20
recruiting. In addition, data on Affirmative Action in hiring are obviously more pertinent to who actually gets
hired, which is the focus of the policy debate.
      Bloch (1994) estimates that under 20 percent of the private sector workforce is not covered by Title VII.
21
Comparisons of the industries and sizes of firms in our sample were also made with firms in the
most recently available published data from County Business Patterns for these metropolitan areas, and
the two samples appeared to be quite comparable.  Finally, we compared the distribution of
18
occupations among our most recently filled jobs with that in the 1990 Census of Population for these
areas, and with the distributions of occupations and worker characteristics among all employees in our
firms, to see whether or not the sample of “marginal” employees (i.e., new hires) differs greatly from
the “average.” We found only minor evidence of this.
19
Variables
The variables used in this study are primarily drawn from survey questions on the last job filled
and the worker hired into that job. In particular, respondents were asked whether or not “Affirmative
Action or Equal Opportunity Law play any role in your recruiting activities for this position,” and also
whether or not these factors play any role in terms of who is hired. The measure we use for Affirmative
Action in this paper is the latter.
20
Given the wording of the question, there may some ambiguity over whether we are picking up
the effects of Affirmative Action or EEO law more generally. However, the evidence suggests that
while EEO law technically refers to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, companies interpret this question
to mean Affirmative Action. All firms with 15 or more employees are bound by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, and hence, by Equal Employment Opportunity law;  in contrast, a smaller subset of firms
217
      Affirmative Action may be implemented for one of three main reasons. First, it is mandatory for firms with
22
federal contracts with 50 or more employees or a contract worth $50,000 or more (Leonard, 1989). Second, it may
be implemented by the courts as a remedy for a finding of past discrimination (see the discussion in Epstein,
1992, Ch. 19). Third, Affirmative Action hiring may be used as a deterrent to claims of discrimination under Title
VII (see the case study discussed in Badgett, 1995, p. 493), or to increase workplace diversity for other reasons.
Voluntary Affirmative Action plans are permitted if they are based on specific plan, correct a previous imbalance,
protect the interests of non-Affirmative Action candidates, and will end when specific goals are met (Gold, 1993).
      Beginning in 1983, only the first two types of establishments had to file (Rodgers and Spriggs, 1996).
23
have Affirmative Action plans. Because only 45 percent of our firms (on an employee-weighted basis)
report any role for Affirmative Action or EEO law in hiring, we assume that respondents were
generally indicating whether the firm used an explicit Affirmative Action policy. Even this, however, is
ambiguous, since Title VII instructs courts to “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include ... reinstatement or hiring of employees ...” when employers are found guilty of
discrimination.
However, we believe that we are generally measuring Affirmative Action plans as prescribed
by Executive Order 11246 or voluntary plans adopted by employers.  Although our self-reported
22
measure is not based directly on federal contractor status, as was Leonard’s, the fraction of
establishments reporting use of Affirmative Action, and their characteristics, are similar in our sample
and Leonard’s, suggesting that our classification scheme does not differ greatly from his. In particular,
roughly 60 percent of the establishments used by Leonard are classified as federal contractors, in a
sample drawn from filers of EEO-1 forms (which represents all establishments above 100 employees,
all over 50 with federal contracts, and all over 25 in multi-establishment firms).  In our size-weighted
23
sample of establishments, 60 percent report some use of Affirmative Action/EEO in recruiting or
hiring. Use of Affirmative Action is highly correlated with establishment size in both samples.
Thus, the classification of firms by Affirmative Action status in our data displays similar
patterns to the classification based on federal contractor status in Leonard’s data. The correspondence
on a firm-by-firm basis is undoubtedly imperfect. It is not obvious, though, that self-reported8
      Because the survey used in this paper was not designed explicitly to study Affirmative Action, the survey did
24
not elicit information that might further clarify the interpretation of the question.
      We code most of these requirements as dummy variables which take on a value of one if the requirement is
25
“absolutely necessary” or “strongly preferred” at the time of hiring and zero if it is “mildly preferred” or “doesn’t
matter.” In contrast, the college requirement is based on an explicit “yes” or “no” question in the survey.
Affirmative Action status is an inferior measure. Given that there is imperfect compliance with
Affirmative Action guidelines for federal contractors (as emphasized, e.g., by Leonard, 1989), and
given that noncontractors can have Affirmative Action plans, a measure of Affirmative Action use
based on what firms perceive themselves to be doing may in fact be preferable to, or at least as good as,
a measure based on federal contractor status.
24
The other job-specific questions include whether or not a college degree is required for the job;
whether or not a high school degree, specific previous experience, vocational training, or references are
each required;  whether each of a set of tasks (dealing with customers directly, reading or writing
25
paragraphs, arithmetic, or computer use) is performed daily on the job; and a set of one-digit
occupational dummies. The characteristics of the last worker hired include race/ethnicity, sex, age, and
educational attainment. Firm-specific characteristics include establishment size, percentage of
workforce covered by collective bargaining, one-digit industry dummy variables, and dummy variables
for location within the central city of the MSA. We also use variables for the race and gender of the
respondent to the survey, and the racial composition of the firm’s customer pool, to control as much as
possible for determinants of racial or gender preferences among survey respondents.9
III. DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION ON HIRING IN FIRMS BY USE OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION
Descriptive Statistics
We begin in Table 1 by providing simple descriptive information on differences between
worker-firm matches in which Affirmative Action is used in hiring and those in which it is not. In
subsequent tables we turn to the differences between minorities and white women who are hired into
firms that use Affirmative Action relative to other groups of workers.
Looking first at demographic characteristics of recent hires, we see that the largest absolute
difference between hires based on Affirmative Action and those that are not is between white men and
women, where the proportion of recent hires accounted for by these groups is .06 lower and .07 higher,
respectively, when Affirmative Action is used in hiring. The proportions of recent hires among the
other demographic groups are not very different across Affirmative Action and non-Affirmative Action
hiring; the proportions of black women and Hispanic men are actually slightly lower. Of course, these
are univariate comparisons, and the influence of Affirmative Action on hiring10
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
     Jobs Filled Using Jobs Filled Not Using 
    Affirmative Action         Affirmative Action    
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
  (1)      (2)   (3)     (4)
Demographic Characteristics of Worker
White male .24 .01 .30 .01
White female .40 .02 .33 .01
Black male .09 .01 .08 .01
Black female .08 .01 .09 .01
Hispanic male .07 .01 .10 .01
Hispanic female .06 .01 .06 .01
Education of Worker
High school dropout .03 .01 .06 .01
GED .002 .001 .003 .001
High school graduate .30 .01 .38 .01
Trade school or some college .22 .01 .22 .01
Associate’s degree .04 .01 .04 .005
Bachelor’s degree .26 .01 .17 .01
Some graduate school .01 .003 .02 .004
Graduate degree .10 .01 .06 .01
Job Requirements
High school degree .85 .01 .74 .01
College degree  .33 .01 .18 .01
References .81 .01 .73 .01
Vocational training .46 .02 .41 .01
Specific experience .72 .01 .62 .01
Customer contact .73 .01 .72 .01
Reading/writing .75 .02 .65 .01
Math .68 .02 .66 .01
Computer .63 .02 .52 .01
Occupation
Management/professional .30 .01 .25 .01
Sales .13 .01 .14 .01
Clerical .32 .02 .25 .01
Agricultural .01 .002 .01 .002
Crafts .04 .01 .09 .01
Operative .08 .01 .11 .01
Labor .03 .01 .04 .01
Service .09 .01 .12 .01
(table continues)11
TABLE 1, continued
     Jobs Filled Using Jobs Filled Not Using 
    Affirmative Action         Affirmative Action    
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
  (1)      (2)   (3)     (4)
Firm Characteristics
Employer size 572.1 47.6 176.9 17.3
Central city .26 .01 .27 .01
Non-central-city MSA .16 .01 .15 .01
Percentage of workforce covered
  by collective bargaining 19.5 1.11 13.8 .84
Percentage of customers black 19.5 .73 16.8 .60
Percentage of customers Hispanic 13.7 .75 12.7 .60
Construction .01 .003 .02 .004
TCPU .07 .01 .05 .01
Wholesale trade .06 .01 .08 .01
Retail trade .11 .01 .18 .01
FIRE .08 .01 .07 .01
Services .46 .02 .37 .01
Public .02 .004 .01 .003
Nondurables manufacturing .10 .01 .09 .01
Durables manufacturing .10 .01 .12 .01
Respondent and Supervisor Characteristics
Respondent’s sex different from
  worker’s sex .50 .02 .41 .01
Respondent’s race different from
  worker’s race .37 .02 .36 .01
Supervisor’s sex different from
  worker’s sex .62 .02 .69 .01
Supervisor’s race different from
  worker’s race .29 .01 .29 .01
Source: Survey of 800 firms each in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles. See text for
description.
Note: There are 1039 observations in columns (1) and (2), and 1481 observations in columns (3) and
(4). There are fewer observations for age, education, percentage of customers in each race group, and
the demographic characteristics of the supervisor and respondent, because of missing data. In the
following tables, a dummy variable for missing data on these variables is included, and the variables
are set to zero. 12
      These results also differ somewhat from those of Leonard (1989) for the 1970s, who finds proportionately
26
bigger effects on black males and females than on white females. But during the 1980s Leonard finds relative
employment of black males and females declining at contractor establishments (relative to noncontractors), which
is consistent with the findings reported here and in Table 2. The results are partly consistent with those reported
by Rodgers and Spriggs (1996), who find that federal contractor status is associated with a higher percentage of
black workers (by 12 percent) and a lower percentage of Hispanic workers (by 0.45 percent) in 1992.
      This evidence is broadly consistent with Leonard’s (1989) findings that Affirmative Action has created the
27
most opportunities for white women in white-collar trainee positions, and for black women in managerial, sales,
clerical, laborer, and white-collar trainee positions.
by demographic group may change once account is taken of firm, job, and other individual
characteristics.
26
The second panel of Table 1 provides information on worker education, and the third panel
provides descriptive information on job requirements for the jobs into which the recent hiring occurred.
We see that workers hired under Affirmative Action tend to be more educated, and that skill
requirements are higher for these jobs for each of the requirements listed in the table. These results
suggest that we may have to compare qualifications of women and minorities relative to white men
within the subset of firms using Affirmative Action; otherwise, we might incorrectly conclude that
Affirmative Action hires are more qualified. This issue receives considerable attention in the empirical
analysis.
Consistent with the above results, the fourth panel in Table 1 reveals that a greater proportion
of hiring in firms using Affirmative Action is into management/professional and clerical jobs than into
blue-collar or service jobs.  Of course, these results do not indicate whether Affirmative Action hiring
27
is used more for such occupations, or whether Affirmative Action leads to more hiring into such
occupations, or to the appearance thereof via title inflation (Smith and Welch, 1984). Given these
questions, it is unclear whether it is always appropriate to control for occupation (or required skills),
which generates only within-job estimates of Affirmative Action effects.
The fifth panel of Table 1 provides descriptive information on firm characteristics, broken
down by whether or not Affirmative Action was used in recent hiring. Firms using Affirmative Action13
      In this table and all that follow, estimates are sample-weighted (as they were in Table 1). This has some
28
bearing on the estimates, because the effects are somewhat different for college-educated and high-school-
educated workers, and the latter are overrepresented in the sample. Thus, the sample weighting produces more
accurate “average” effects.
are much larger, have a significantly higher proportion of the workforce covered by collective
bargaining, and are significantly more likely to be in the services industry. These firms also have higher
percentages of black and Hispanic customers.
Finally, the sixth panel of Table 1 reports on the demographic characteristics of supervisors and
respondents to the survey. We see that respondents—who are responsible for hiring—are more likely to
be the opposite sex from the new hires in firms that report using Affirmative Action in hiring, although
this is not true of supervisors. In the multivariate analyses that follow, we ask whether these
characteristics of respondents or supervisors have any bearing on the results for outcomes over which
respondents or supervisors exert some control, such as promotions and performance ratings.
The Effects of Affirmative Action on Hiring of Women and Minorities
Table 2 presents a multivariate descriptive analysis of the relationship between Affirmative
Action hiring and the demographic group of the recent hire, based on logit or multinomial logit
estimates of the association between Affirmative Action hiring and the demographic group of the recent
hire, accounting—in different specifications—for differences in firm characteristics, in the
occupational distribution of hires, and in job requirements.  In each column, we report the estimated
28
effects of Affirmative Action hiring on the probability that the hire was in the demographic group listed
in the left-hand column, relative to the probability that the hire was in the omitted demographic group
(i.e., the logit or multinomial logit coefficient estimates). The marginal effects on the probabilities are
reported in square brackets.14
TABLE 2
Logit and Multinomial Logit Estimates of Effect of the Affirmative Action
on Demographic Group of Hire
   Logit Coefficients    Multinomial Coefficients
 (1) (1  )   (2) (2  )
Minority or white female  .23 .21
(.10) (.11)
[.03] [.02]
White female ... ... .40 .34
(.11) (.12)
[.07] [.04]
Black male ... ... .25 .46
(.17) (.18)
[.005] [.02]
Black female ... ... .02 .08
(.18) (.19)
[-.01] [-.01]
Hispanic male ... ... -.17 .14
(.19) (.20)
[-.03] [-.01]
Hispanic female ... ... .13 .19
(.20) (.21)
[-.004] [-.003]
White male [-.05] [-.05] [-.05] [-.06]
Occupation and job
requirement controls No Yes No Yes
Note: Estimated logit coefficients of dummy variable for Affirmative Action hire are reported in
columns (1) and (1  ), and multinomial coefficients in columns (2) and (2  ). Estimates are reported
relative to the omitted (white male) category. There are 2520 observations. All specifications include
dummy variables for city and year and firm controls. Asian male and female hires are also included as
outcomes, but results are not reported. In columns (1) and (2), “minority” refers to blacks and
Hispanics. Standard errors of coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses. Marginal effects on
probability of outcome evaluated at weighted sample means are reported in square brackets. Estimates
are weighted.15
      “Minority or woman” refers to white women, blacks, and Hispanics. All of the models estimated in the paper
29
also included categories for Asian men and women. However, we do not focus on (or report) results for Asians,
since most of the debate seems to be about the treatment of relatively disadvantaged subgroups of the population,
a categorization which may not apply to Asians.
      See footnote 26.
30
We first look at aggregated demographic groups. Columns (1) and (1  ) report estimates for the
probability that the recent hire was a minority or white female. In column (1), controls for city and year
of hire, as well as firm characteristics (listed in Table 1) are included. The probability that a minority
member or woman was hired is estimated to be significantly higher, by .03, when Affirmative Action is
used in hiring.  Column (1 ) adds controls for the occupations and job requirements listed in Table 1.
29
Probably in part because Affirmative Action is used relatively more in occupations into which women
are more likely to be hired, the association between Affirmative Action and hiring of minorities or
women weakens slightly when we include these controls.
Columns (2) and (2  ) repeat estimates with the same control variables, but report estimates of
multinomial logit models for the probability of a hire in each of the demographic groups identified in
the data. The estimates in column (2  ) indicate that the probabilities that white women and black men
are hired, relative to the probability that a white man is hired, are significantly higher when Affirmative
Action is used in hiring; the hiring of black and Hispanic women appears to be unaffected.  Comparing
30
effects on probabilities to the means in Table 1 for each group, we see that Affirmative Action is
associated with an increase of about 10 percent (not ten percentage points) in the probability of hiring
white women, and an increase of about 20 percent in the probability of hiring black men. Finally, the
last row indicates that the probability that a white man is hired is lower by about 15–20 percent under16
      We divide 0.05 or 0.06 by the average proportion of white males in non-Affirmative Action firms in Table 1.
31
Note that in columns (1) and (1 ), the marginal effects reported for minorities or white females are smaller in
absolute value than those for white males. This is because Asians are also included in the estimation, and their
hiring appears to be boosted more by Affirmative Action.
      Further, if there is some job segregation by demographic characteristics, or if overall hiring at firms using
32
Affirmative Action falls because of the policy, the wages of white males in non-Affirmative Action firms will be
lower because of an outward labor supply shift.
Affirmative Action.  Presumably, most of these white men are then hired in firms not using
31
Affirmative Action; these firms likely pay less, among other reasons because they are smaller.
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These results, coupled with evidence of strengthened enforcement activity in 1989 and
especially in 1993 (Anderson, 1996), suggest that Affirmative Action has real consequences for the
hiring behavior of firms. We next turn to the more contentious issue of the relative qualifications and
performance of women and minorities hired under Affirmative Action.
IV. RELATIVE QUALIFICATIONS AND PERFORMANCE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
HIRES
Having documented the associations between Affirmative Action and hiring of minorities and
women, we now turn to the central question of this paper: whether Affirmative Action leads to the
hiring of less qualified women or minorities. Our general approach is to let Q be a measure of the
qualifications or performance of the last worker hired, and to estimate equations of the form:
(1)   Q =  WM (1 – AA ) +  D AA +  WM AA  +  D (1 – AA ) +  X +  Z +  , ijk  ijk  jk ijk jk  ijk jk ijk jk j  k   ijk
where AA is a dummy variable indicating that Affirmative Action was used in hiring, D is a vector of
demographic dummy variables for women or minorities, WM is a dummy variable for white males, X
is a vector of job characteristics, and Z a vector of firm characteristics; i, j, and k denote the last worker
hired, the most recent job filled, and the firm, respectively. Note that we include separate intercepts for17
each demographic group distinguished by the Affirmative Action status of the firm, and no common
intercept.
This specification provides us with a number of potential comparisons for estimating the effects
of Affirmative Action in hiring. One interesting comparison is between female or minority hires in
firms using Affirmative Action and white male hires in firms using Affirmative Action. The difference
in Q for this comparison is given by (  –  ). A second interesting comparison is between female or
minority hires in firms using Affirmative Action and female or minority hires in firms not using
Affirmative Action, which is captured by the difference (  –  ). A third comparison is between female
or minority hires in firms using Affirmative Action and white male hires in firms not using Affirmative
Action, which is measured by (  –  ); this comparison may be relevant to those white male workers
who might otherwise have been hired in firms using Affirmative Action had the policy not been in
place.
With respect to the first two comparisons, in particular, there is the potential for misleading
inferences to be drawn. For example, suppose that the estimate of (  –  ) is a large negative number,
indicating that women or minorities hired into firms using Affirmative Action are less qualified than
white men hired into similar firms. However, there may be a similar shortfall in qualifications between
women or minorities and white men in firms not using Affirmative Action; workers in non-Affirmative
Action firms should then serve as a control group to pick up overall differences between minorities or
women and white men. For example, Hispanics may be perceived as less qualified or perform less well
because of language barriers, regardless of whether the firm into which they are hired uses Affirmative
Action. Continuing with this example, this implies that to estimate the independent effects of
Affirmative Action on differences between white male and Hispanic workers, we want to subtract any
shortfall in qualifications attributable to language in firms not using Affirmative Action, and to ask
instead whether the shortfall is relatively larger in firms using Affirmative Action. In general, the
shortfall in qualifications (or performance) in firms not using Affirmative Action is measured by (  –18
      Note that the difference-in-differences estimator (  –  ) – (  –  ) is equal to the difference between the first
33
and third comparisons, (  –  ) – (  –  ), plus the second comparison, (  –  ). Note also that this estimator does
not distinguish between a larger difference in qualifications in firms using Affirmative Action that arises from
lower standards for women or minorities, or higher standards for white men, relative to firms not using
Affirmative Action.
      This estimator is (  –  ) – (  –  ), which is equal to (  –  ) – (  –  ).
34
      A relevant differences-in-differences estimate with respect to the difference (  –  ) is (woman/minority AA
35
hire vs. white male non-AA hire) – (woman/minority non-AA hire vs. white male non-AA hire). This estimate
corresponds to the difference (  –  ). This estimator might correct for lower qualifications or skills overall in
firms using Affirmative Action. However, Table 1 indicates that this is unlikely to be an issue.
), leading to the difference-in-differences estimate of (  –  ) – (  –  ).  Thus, critics of Affirmative
33
Action make a potential error if they base their criticisms only on observed shortfalls in qualifications
at firms using Affirmative Action, rather than the net difference in these shortfalls between the two
sectors.
Similarly, if the comparison (  –  ) indicates that women or minorities hired at firms using
Affirmative Action are less qualified than similar workers hired at firms not using Affirmative Action,
we have to ask whether there is a similar difference in qualifications between white men hired at firms
using Affirmative Action and white men hired at other firms, because of differences between the two
sets of firms that are common to all demographic groups; this leads to the same difference-in-
differences estimator.  However, the generally higher skills and qualifications in firms using
34
Affirmative Action suggests that the difference-in-differences estimator is more relevant to the
comparison between women or minorities and white men at firms using Affirmative Action. Table 3
summarizes the alternative estimates we present.
35
There are three potential econometric problems with estimates of equation (1). First, we cannot
be certain that the differentials associated with Affirmative Action do not reflect unmeasured job or
firm characteristics that differ across firms that use Affirmative Action in hiring and hire minorities or
women, and firms that use Affirmative Action but do not hire minorities or women—i.e., unobserved
characteristics that vary within the subset of firms using Affirmative Action in such a way as to be
correlated with minority or female hiring. But, as noted above, the difference-19
TABLE 3
Alternative Estimators of Differentials in Qualifications or Performance
Associated with Affirmative Action
Equation:
Q  =  WM   (1 – AA ) +  D AA  +  WM AA  +  D (1 – AA ) +  X +  Z +  ijk ijk jk ijk jk ijk jk ijk jk j  k   ijk
Simple Differences:
 –   = female/minority AA hire vs. white male AA hire
 –   = female/minority AA hire vs. woman/minority non-AA hire
 –   = female/minority AA hire vs. white male non-AA hire
Difference-in-differences:
(  –  ) – (  –  ) = (  –  ) – (  –  ) = 
(female/minority AA hire vs. white male AA hire) – (female/minority non-AA hire vs. white male non-
AA hire)
       =
(female/minority AA hire vs. female/minority non-AA hire) – (white male AA hire vs. white male non-
AA hire)20
in-differences estimator eliminates unobserved differences in job or firm characteristics by race or sex
that are constant across firms that do and do not use Affirmative Action (or differences by Affirmative
Action status that are constant across demographic groups). Without data on multiple hires for the same
job in the same firm, we must simply make the assumption that unobserved job or firm characteristics
are not correlated with the Affirmative Action-demographic group interactions (D AA) as well as with
qualifications, in order to identify relative differentials in qualifications among minorities or women
hired under Affirmative Action.
Second, if the decision to use Affirmative Action is endogenous, then D AA may be correlated
with the error term. If firms with the smallest skill differentials between minorities and females, on the
one hand, and white males, on the other, are most likely to embrace such hiring (since they may face
the lowest costs from using Affirmative Action), our estimates may be biased in the direction of finding
no differences in qualifications, relative to the estimates we would obtain from an exogenously imposed
policy (such as requirements on federal contractors). However, the correspondence between the
patterns of reported use of Affirmative Action in our data and in Leonard’s data (based on contractor
status), coupled with the fact that firms in some industries are much more likely to be federal
contractors than are firms in other industries, suggests that a good part of the variation in use of
Affirmative Action is exogenous. Furthermore, the main goal of this paper is to evaluate the effects of
Affirmative Action as it is used in practice, and not to evaluate the effects of an exogenously imposed
Affirmative Action policy. For this question, the issue of self-selection into the sample using
Affirmative Action is irrelevant. It becomes relevant, however, if we try to draw conclusions regarding,
for example, the effects of eliminating Affirmative Action practices. As this discussion emphasizes,
considerable caution must be exercised in drawing any such conclusions from our evidence, as the
assumptions required to justify such conclusions may not hold in our data.21
      This evidence is broadly consistent with lower education and higher dropout rates of Hispanics (Hauser and
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Phang, 1993).
Finally, as discussed above, there is some ambiguity in the classification of firms using
Affirmative Action. Though we believe it is small, any misclassification of firms is likely to bias the
results toward finding no impact of Affirmative Action. Since for many demographic groups our
evidence points to no impact, the results must be interpreted cautiously, pending development of
superior data sources to reexamine some of the questions we consider in this paper.
Educational Qualifications
The qualification we can most easily identify among workers is their education. Table 4 reports
alternative simple differences and difference-in-differences estimates for years of education of the last
worker hired. The estimates in Panel A are based on specifications that include only city and year
dummy variables and firm characteristics as control variables. The estimates in column (1) measure (
–  ), the differences between women or minorities and white men hired at firms using Affirmative
Action. For all five groups, the educational level of women or minority Affirmative Action hires is
significantly lower than that of white men hired into similar firms; the differential is less than one-half
year for white females, but about one and one-half years for blacks, and two and one-half years for
Hispanics.  However, the estimates of (  –  ) in column (3) indicate that these educational shortfalls
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also appear—although to a lesser extent—between women and minorities hired in firms using
Affirmative Action, and white men hired in firms not using Affirmative Action. At the same time, the
estimates in column (2) indicate that, with the exception of Hispanic men, there are negligible
differences between women and minorities in firms using Affirmative Action and in firms not using
Affirmative Action. The combined evidence implies that the educational shortfalls in column (1)
overstate the shortfalls that can be attributed to Affirmative Action hiring. This is reflected in the
difference-in-differences estimates in column (4), which indicate considerably smaller22
TABLE 4
OLS Estimates for Educational Level of Last Hire
                       Difference Relative to:                     
White Male Same Demo. Group White Male Difference-in-
AA Hire Non-AA Hire Non-AA Hire Differences
AA hire: (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Firm Controls Only
White female -.45 .46 .21 -.20
(.16) (.13) (.14) (.20)
Black male -1.42 .32 -.77 -.33
(.23) (.27) (.22) (.31)
Black female -1.64 .28 -.98 -.38
(.24) (.27) (.23) (.31)
Hispanic male -2.49 -.98 -1.83 -1.64
(.26) (.28) (.25) (.32)
Hispanic female -2.42 -.16 -1.76 -.81
(.28) (.32) (.27) (.36)
B. Occupation and Job Requirement Controls Added
White female -.64 .22 -.28 -.14
(.14) (.11) (.12) (.17)
Black male -.76 .24 -.39 -.13
(.20) (.23) (.19) (.27)
Black female -1.28 .19 -.92 -.17
(.21) (.23) (.20) (.27)
Hispanic male -1.51 -.56 -1.15 -.92
(.23) (.24)  (.22) (.27)
Hispanic female -1.98 -.44 -1.61 -.80
(.24) (.27) (.23) (.30)
Note: There are 2,388 observations. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All specifications include
dummy variables for city and year and firm controls, as well as dummy variables and interactions for Asian males
and females. In Panel B educational requirements are not included. There are fewer observations than in the
previous tables because of missing data on the recent hire’s actual schooling. The educational variable is coded as
follows: drop out (10 years); GED (11 years); high school graduate (12 years); trade school or some college (13
years); Associate’s degree (14 years); Bachelor’s degree (16 years); some graduate school (17 years); and
graduate degree (18 years). Estimates are weighted. The difference-in-differences estimates in column (4)
correspond to either of the following two equivalent relative comparisons: (female/minority AA hire vs. white
male AA hire) – (female/minority non-AA hire vs. white male non-AA hire); or (female/minority AA hire vs.
female/minority non-AA hire) – (white male AA hire vs. white male non-AA hire). A relevant differences-in-
differences estimate with respect to the estimates in column (3) is (female/minority AA hire vs. white male non-
AA hire) – (female/minority non-AA hire vs. white male non-AA hire). This estimate corresponds to those in
column (2).23
educational shortfalls of women and minorities attributable to Affirmative Action hiring. The
differentials for white women and blacks are small and insignificant, while only those for Hispanics
(especially men) remain large and significant.
In Panel B we present the same types of estimates, but include controls for occupation and job
requirements in equation (1). We know from Tables 1 and 2 that the apparent effects of Affirmative
Action in shifting the demographic composition of recent hires is weaker within than across
occupations; it therefore may be more appropriate to look at relative educational attainment of newly
hired workers within our broadly defined occupations, and controlling for job requirements. At some
level, the relevant policy question concerns the relative skills of individuals hired to do the same job; if
minorities and women hired under Affirmative Action are matched to jobs that are appropriate for their
skill levels, the within-job estimates might be most appropriate. On the other hand, occupation and job
requirements likely reflect the characteristics of the worker hired as well as the job, in which case we
may be overcontrolling by including them as independent variables; that is, Affirmative Action may
lead to the hiring of less skilled women or minorities who are then allocated to less demanding jobs. As
a consequence, firms using Affirmative Action may have created more unskilled job slots than they
would have in the absence of these policies, thus lowering the overall skill level of their workforce.
Given these ambiguities regarding the choice of specification, we think it best to present both types of
evidence.
The qualitative conclusions in Panel B are very similar to those in Panel A. The only notable
difference is that the education differentials between women or minority workers hired by firms using
Affirmative Action and other workers are smaller, especially for Hispanic males, both in the simple
differences and the difference-in-differences estimates. The decline in the magnitude of the shortfall for
Hispanic males hired by firms using Affirmative Action when we control for job requirements suggests
that to some extent they are allocated to jobs which require less education.24
      The lower percentage of applicants from Hispanics in these firms is not significantly different from zero, but
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it is significantly different from the fraction of blacks applying.
      One reason for the lower application rate of Hispanics at firms using Affirmative Action might be that
38
Hispanic immigrants are more likely to work in smaller establishments that are owned or operated by co-ethnics,
especially in Los Angeles.
Given the results in Table 2 indicating that hiring of Hispanics is not boosted by Affirmative
Action, it is perhaps a bit difficult to interpret the lower qualifications of Hispanics as resulting from
Affirmative Action hiring. However, the Table 2 results are based on cross-sectional data, rather than
panel data, so it is possible that those firms that use Affirmative Action would have otherwise hired
even fewer Hispanics. To shed some additional light on this question, we analyzed data on the
percentage of applicants at the firm accounted for by each demographic group, as reported by the
respondent. These reveal that, in firms using Affirmative Action, the percentage of applications from
blacks is higher (by roughly two percentage points each) than in firms not using Affirmative Action,
while this percentage is lower for Hispanics (by 0.8 percentage points).  Given their higher overall
37
skill needs and lower application rates from this group, firms that use Affirmative Action may have to
be less selective in hiring Hispanic applicants.
38
An alternative approach to the issue of educational qualifications is to ask whether minorities or
women hired under Affirmative Action are less qualified relative to the educational requirements of the
job, rather than simply relative to white men. We refer to this outcome as indicating that the employee
is “underqualified,” rather than “less qualified.” For example, if Hispanics are sufficiently qualified for
the jobs they hold, while white men are either overqualified or allocated to more demanding jobs, then
the criticism of Affirmative Action on the grounds of lower educational levels of Hispanics (as in Table
4) would be blunted. Conversely, while we find no evidence suggesting that white women or blacks
hired under Affirmative Action have relatively less education than white men, they might be more
underqualified relative to the jobs that they hold.25
      There are very few cases in the sample of workers hired into jobs requiring college degrees that did not have
39
at least an Associate’s degree.
      Because this specification looks at education relative to educational requirements, it is not surprising that
40
controlling for other job characteristics has little influence on the estimates.
To examine this question, we use information on the educational requirement for the job
reported by the employer, and estimate logit models for whether the individual hired had less than the
reported required amount of education. There is some ambiguity in the coding of this dependent
variable, since employers were asked whether a college degree was required, without specifying
whether this was an Associate’s or Bachelor’s degree. We assume that they were referring to the
latter.
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The results are reported in Table 5; the control variables are the same as in Table 4. In column
(1) in Panel A, the positive signs of the estimates indicate that for all groups, women or minorities hired
under Affirmative Action are relatively more likely to be underqualified than white men hired into
firms using Affirmative Action. However, the estimated coefficients are significant only for black
females (at the 5-percent level) and Hispanic females (at the 10-percent level). In column (3), we find a
significantly higher probability that black men hired under Affirmative Action are more likely to be
underqualified, relative to white men in firms not using Affirmative Action. However, in this table the
column (2) estimates also indicate that some groups of women or minorities hired under Affirmative
Action are underqualified relative to comparable workers in firms not using Affirmative Action. As a
result, the difference-in-differences estimates are quite similar to those in the other columns, although
now the only significant evidence of underqualification of women or minorities hired under Affirmative




Logit Estimates for Probability that Last Hire Had Less than Reported Education Requirement
                       Difference Relative to:                    
White Male Same Demo. Group White Male Difference-in-
AA Hire Non-AA Hire Non-AA Hire Differences
AA hire: (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Firm Controls Only
White female .39 -.01 .67 -.30
(.39) (.31) (.36) (.52)
[.02] [-.001] [.04] [-.02]
Black male .73 1.10 1.01 .81
(.50) (.75) (.49) (.86)
[.04] [.06] [.06] [.05]
Black female 1.41 1.74 1.69 1.46
(.49) (.70) (.48) (.82)
[.08] [.10] [.10] [.08]
Hispanic male .31 .29 .59 .003
(.61) (.67) (.59) (.79)
[.02] [.02] [.03] [.000]
Hispanic female .92 1.12 1.20 .84
(.56) (.76) (.55) (.87)
[.05] [.06] [.07] [.05]
B. Occupation and Job Requirement Controls Added
White female  .18 -.04 .57 -.43
(.41) (.32) (.39) (.54)
[.01] [-.002] [.03] [-.02]
Black male .79 .98 1.18 .59
(.53) (.76) (.51) (.88)
[.05] [.06] [.07] [.03]
Black female 1.29 1.60 1.68 1.21
(.50) (.70) (.50) (.83)
[.07] [.09] [.10] [.07]
Hispanic male .63 .42 1.02 .03
(.63) (.68) (.61) (.83)
[.04] [.02] [.06] [.002]
Hispanic female  .84 .94 1.23 .55
(.57) (.77) (.57) (.88)
[.05] [.05] [.07] [.03]
Note: There are 2,073 observations in Panel A, and 2,063 in Panel B. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and partial
derivatives evaluated at weighted sample means in square brackets. All specifications include dummy variables for city and year and
firm controls, as well as dummy variables and interactions for Asian males and females. The dependent variable is coded as one if the
job requires a college degree and the hire has less than a college degree, or the job requires a high school degree and the hire has less
than a high school degree (including a GED). We assume that a required college degree refers to a Bachelor’s degree. In Panel B the
educational requirements are not included. The sample is smaller than in the previous table because data on the education requirement
for the job are needed. The number of observations varies with the number of independent variables (or combinations thereof) which
serve as perfect predictors of the dependent variable. Estimates are weighted.27
Other Measures of Qualifications
In addition to looking at educational qualifications, we can use the data on noneducational job
requirements of recent hires to assess further whether minorities or women hired under Affirmative
Action are less qualified. Although these data refer to the job and not the worker, they may contain
some information on worker qualifications, although they may tell us more about the skill requirements
of jobs to which various groups of workers have been matched than about skill differences among
workers within jobs.
As Table 1 indicates, we have data on seven job requirements. To provide a summary measure,
we construct the dependent variable used in Table 6 simply as the number of requirements of the job
held by the recent hire. The estimates in column (1) indicate significant shortfalls of black and Hispanic
males hired in firms using Affirmative Action relative to white males in similar firms. However, these
shortfalls also exist—although they are somewhat smaller—relative to white males hired into firms not
using Affirmative Action, as shown in column (3), but do not appear in comparing women and
minorities in the Affirmative Action and non-Affirmative Action sectors, as shown in column (2). On
net, therefore, the difference-in-differences estimates for black and Hispanic males reveal much
smaller differentials attributable to Affirmative Action, significant only for Hispanic males. In addition,
the difference-in-differences estimates indicate that Hispanic women hired in firms using Affirmative
Action are in jobs with relatively more requirements, indicating that Hispanic women may possess
other skills or qualifications that offset their lower educational qualifications. In Panel B, when
occupation controls are added, the differentials for black and Hispanic men are reduced, with the
difference-in-differences estimate no longer significant for the latter group. Of course this may just
reflect the fact that much of the variation in job requirements occurs across rather than within
occupations.28
TABLE 6
OLS Estimates for Number of Job Requirements
                       Difference Relative to:                    
White Male Same Demo. Group White Male Difference-in-
AA Hire Non-AA Hire Non-AA Hire Differences
AA hire: (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Firm Controls Only
White female .15 .36 .52 -.003
(.12) (.10) (.11) (.16)
Black male -1.04 .17 -.67 -.20
(.19) (.21) (.18) (.25)
Black female  -.27 .52 .10 .15
(.19) (.22) (.19) (.25)
Hispanic male -1.34 -.14 -.97 -.51
(.21) (.22) (.20) (.25)
Hispanic female  -.09 1.16 .28 .79
(.22) (.26) (.22) (.28)
B. Occupation Controls Added
White female -.09 .28 .20 -.01
(.12) (.10) (.11) (.15)
Black male -.76 .08 -.47 -.21
(.18) (.20) (.17) (.23)
Black female  -.26 .46 .03 .18
(.18) (.20) (.18) (.23)
Hispanic male -.87 .02 -.58 -.27
(.20) (.21) (.19) (.24)
Hispanic female  .05 1.11 .34 .82
(.21) (.24) (.20) (.27)
Note: There are 2,520 observations. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Includes city and year dummy
variables and firm controls, as well as dummy variables and interactions for Asian males and females. Estimates
are weighted.29
      As an example, Bloch (1994) discusses James v. Stockham Valves and Fittings Company , in which an
41
employer claimed that formal education requirements for manual laborers led to hiring of more whites than
blacks. But the court ruled that education was unrelated to job performance.
      The wage and promotion results might still be of some interest, since there is virtually no empirical evidence
42
to date on the relationship of Affirmative Action to these outcomes.
      A similar variable is used in the EOPP Survey (e.g., Barron, et al., 1989) and a more recent, similar survey of
43
members of the National Federation of Independent Businesses (Bishop, 1993).
Job-Related Outcomes
The results in the preceding sections provide some evidence of relatively lower educational or
skill qualifications of blacks and Hispanics hired under Affirmative Action. But there remains the
question of whether the shortfalls in these two observable measures of qualifications imply inferior
performance on the job. If they do not, then there is perhaps no reason to be concerned with the
apparent lower qualifications of minorities hired under Affirmative Action.
41
Consequently, in this subsection we look at three employment outcomes that should be related
to actual job performance: starting wages, current wages, and promotions. Looking at this broader set
of job-related outcomes is useful for another important reason—namely, educational levels and job
requirements are only a subset of the many dimensions along which a worker’s qualifications can be
measured. Measures such as wages and promotions should, if they are related to productivity, provide
more of a summary or “sufficient” statistic for a worker’s qualifications. A potential objection,
however, is that the same pressures that may lead to the hiring of less qualified workers under
Affirmative Action may also lead employers to pay and promote women and minorities at a rate that is
more than commensurate with their productivity, in which case wages and promotions would not be
useful as measures of their relative job performance.
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To obtain a more independent measure of worker performance in these jobs, we use a rating of
the worker’s job performance (measured on a scale of 1 to 100) elicited from the person interviewed.
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The survey also asked for the supervisor’s rating of the typical new hire into the job, which lets us30
      One might object that by controlling for differences in qualifications, we bias the results against finding
44
poorer performance, as measured by wages (or promotions). However, the results reported in Table 7 turned out
to be insensitive to the inclusion of these variables.
standardize across firms and jobs by looking at the deviation of the new hire’s performance rating from
the usual or typical rating. If the performance ratings were the product of a formal evaluation procedure
that is used to set wages and determine promotions, they might be contaminated in the same way as
data on wages and promotions (as employers might feel constrained to manipulate performance ratings
to back up their wage and promotion decisions). However, these ratings are informal and unrelated to
any actual pay and promotion decisions, and survey respondents were promised full confidentiality.
Therefore, the ratings seem likely to provide an unbiased measure of a worker’s true job performance.
Yet even the standardized performance ratings are likely to be measured with considerable
error. If the measurement error is random with respect to true performance and the independent
variables, it should lead to larger standard errors on the estimated coefficients. However, the estimated
signs of these coefficients should not be biased. Thus, if we fail to find negative effects of Affirmative
Action on these ratings, it would be difficult to interpret such findings as stemming solely from
measurement error.
Wages
Regressions for logs of starting and current wages are reported in Panels A and B of Table 7. In
addition to the firm, occupation, and job requirement controls, we add standard human capital controls
(education and age to both sets of equations, and tenure to the equation for current wages).  As a
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means of assessing the reliability of the data, it is worth noting that wage differentials between women
or minorities and white men in firms not using Affirmative Action, which can be calculated from the
estimates in column (3) minus the estimates in column (2), indicate significantly lower wages31
TABLE 7
OLS Estimates of Log Starting and Log Current Wage Regressions, and Promotion Logits
                       Difference Relative to:                    
White Male Same Demo. Group White Male Difference-in-
AA Hire Non-AA Hire Non-AA Hire Differences
AA hire: (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Log Starting Wage
White female -.10 -.05 -.21 .06
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.04)
Black male .04 .09 -.08 .20
(.04) (.05) (.04) (.06)
Black female  -.13 .01 -.24 .12
(.04) (.05) (.04) (.06)
Hispanic male  -.08 .11 -.20 .22
(.05) (.05) (.04) (.06)
Hispanic female  -.22 -.04 -.34 .07
(.05) (.06) (.05) (.06)
B. Log Current Wage
White female  -.10 -.05 -.22 .07
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.04)
Black male  .05 .08 -.07 .20
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.06)
Black female  -.14 -.01 -.26 .11
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.06)
Hispanic male  -.06 .14 -.17 .26
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.06)
Hispanic female  -.20 -.05 -.31 .07
(.06) (.06) (.05) (.07)
(table continues)32
TABLE 7, continued
                       Difference Relative to:                    
White Male Same Demo. Group White Male Difference-in-
AA Hire Non-AA Hire Non-AA Hire Differences
AA hire: (1) (2) (3) (4)
C. Promotions
White female -.51 -.74 -.97 -.28
(.43) (.34) (.37) (.50)
[-.03] [-.05] [-.07] [-.02]
Black male  .77 .03 .30 .50
(.56) (.55) (.51) (.65)
[.05] [.002] [.02] [.03]
Black female  .57 .39 .11 .85
(.63) (.65) (.59) (.74)
[.04] [.03] [.01] [.06]
Hispanic male .63 .61 .17 1.08
(.62) (.60) (.57) (.70)
[.04] [.04] [.01] [.07]
Hispanic female  1.78 2.71 1.32 3.18
(.57) (.78) (.53) (.85)
[.12] [.18] [.09] [.22]
Note: There are 2,141 observations in Panels A and B, and 2,445 in Panel C. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses, and partial derivatives evaluated at weighted sample means in square brackets. All specifications
include dummy variables for city and year and firm, occupation, and job requirement controls. In addition,
controls for education, age, tenure (in all but the starting wage regression), and dummy variables for different race
or sex of respondent or supervisor are included. Estimates are weighted.33
      Leonard (1990) reports similar evidence indicating that wages of minority members relative to white males
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are higher in cities and industries with high proportions of employment in establishments subject to Affirmative
Action.
      Table 1 indicates that the percentage of the workforce covered by collective bargaining is higher in firms
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using Affirmative Action. However, the relatively higher wages paid to women and minorities in such firms do
not appear to be attributable to the well-documented tendency for race and sex differentials in wages to be lower
among union workers. We reestimated the models adding a set of interactions between the demographic dummy
variables D and two alternative measures of unionization: the percentage covered by collective bargaining; and a
dummy if this percentage was greater than zero. The relatively higher wages paid to women or minorities in firms
using Affirmative Action, based on the difference-in-differences estimates, did not diminish in this augmented
specification. In fact, in these data the effects of unions appear to be reversed, with the signs of the estimated
coefficients of the demographic dummy variable-union interactions negative (although generally not significant).
Part of the problem may be that we do not know the union status of the specific recent hire to whom the data
refer.
      This was confirmed by estimating similar regressions for the change between the starting and current wage.
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None of the estimated coefficients of the Affirmative Action-demographic group interactions were statistically
significant.
paid to women and minorities. The estimated differentials are -.16 for white women, -.17 for black
men, -.25 for black women, -.31 for Hispanic men, and -.30 for Hispanic women.
 Turning to the three alternative comparisons for women or minority workers in firms using
Affirmative Action, column (1) indicates that the wage differentials between these workers and white
males in similar firms are considerably smaller than the wage differentials in firms not using
Affirmative Action, noted above.  In fact, for black men the wage differential is erased. Because the
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wage differentials compared with white men in firms not using Affirmative Action are somewhat
larger, as reported in column (3), and the differences between women and minorities in the two types of
firms are small, as reported in column (2), the difference-in-differences estimates in column (4)
indicate that Affirmative Action raises the relative wages of women and minorities, although most
groups still earn less than comparable white men in firms using Affirmative Action; the increase is
substantial for black and Hispanic men, on the order of 20 percent.  The results are quite similar for
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starting and current wages, indicating no differences in wage growth.
4734
      A limitation of the promotions variable is that median tenure with the employer is roughly two to three
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months in our sample. The proportion of workers promoted is only .08.
Promotions
Panel C of Table 7 reports logit estimates of equations for whether the newly hired worker was
promoted.  The independent variables are the same as in the other panels, with the exception of an
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additional specification including controls for whether the race or sex of the supervisor differed from
that of the worker. The results in column (1) suggest that the probability of promotion for blacks and
Hispanics hired in firms using Affirmative Action is higher than for white men in similar firms,
although the differential is statistically significant only for Hispanic women. The difference-in-
differences estimates in column (4) convey the same result. Finally, again subtracting the estimates in
column (2) from those in column (3), we see that in firms not using Affirmative Action, promotion
probabilities are lower for each of the five groups of minorities or women. However, in contrast to
wages, the estimates suggest that the negative promotion differentials for Hispanics and blacks in these
firms is reversed in firms using Affirmative Action. This is so despite the earlier evidence that blacks
and Hispanics are relatively less qualified in terms of educational attainment.
Performance Ratings
Given our uncertainty over whether the wage and promotion results reflect better performance
of blacks and Hispanics, or preferential treatment, we turn in Table 8 to the performance rating
regressions, in which the dependent variable is the measured rating minus the typical rating. We report
results including only the firm (and city and year) controls in Panel A, and adding in the occupation, job
requirement, and other controls in Panel B. The estimates in column (1) indicate that black females
hired under Affirmative Action obtain higher performance ratings than white males hired in similar
firms; the differential is significant at the 10-percent level. The evidence for white females, black
males, and Hispanic females also indicates that their performance is not lower than that35
TABLE 8
OLS Estimates of (Performance Rating – Typical Rating for Job) Regressions
                       Difference Relative to:                    
White Male Same Demo. Group White Male Difference-in-
AA Hire Non-AA Hire Non-AA Hire Differences
AA hire: (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Firm Controls Only
White female -1.24 .01 -1.27 .03
(1.52) (1.17) (1.20) (1.91)
Black male .98 2.72 .95 2.74
(2.26) (2.42) (2.08) (2.85)
Black female  3.96 5.76 3.93 5.78
(2.41) (2.56) (2.25) (2.96)
Hispanic male -6.36 -5.94 -6.38 -5.91
(2.35) (2.41) (2.19) (2.84)
Hispanic female  -3.00 .71 -3.02 .73
(2.59) (2.91) (2.45) (3.27)
B. Occupation, Job Requirement, Education, Age, Tenure, and Different
Race or Sex of Respondent or Supervisor Controls Added
White female -1.94 -.51 -1.94 -.50
(1.57) (1.19) (1.29) (1.92)
Black male 3.60 1.65 3.60 1.65
(2.47) (2.43) (2.33) (2.86)
Black female  6.06 5.02 6.06 5.02
(2.63) (2.55) (2.51) (2.96)
Hispanic male -2.54 -5.94 -2.54 -5.94
(2.67) (2.42) (2.55) (2.85)
Hispanic female  -.56 -.80 -.57 -.80
(2.88) (2.92) (2.78) (3.27)
Note: There are 2,134 observations. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All specifications include
dummy variables for city and year and firm, occupation, and job requirement controls. Estimates are weighted.36
      If use of Affirmative Action in hiring is not exogenous, it is possible that the relatively positive ratings given
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to blacks in firms using Affirmative Action might reflect relatively favorable views of minorities at firms that
have chosen to use Affirmative Action. But it is unclear why this would be true for many groups but not Hispanic
males. Our controls for the racial composition of customers and for the race/gender of the respondent should also
help to control for such factors. We also note that our job requirement controls include information on customer
contact, where immigrant Hispanics or Asians might be at some disadvantage relative to native-born whites and
blacks.
      The estimated coefficients of the demographic dummy variables (measuring performance rating differentials
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in firms not using Affirmative Action) were all statistically insignificant, although they were positive for all
groups except white women. The estimated coefficients of the dummy variables for different race or sex of the
respondent or supervisor indicated that supervisors or respondents of the opposite sex resulted in performance
ratings that were significantly higher, by about two points, whereas supervisors or respondents of the opposite
race resulted in ratings that were lower by about one to two points (significantly so for supervisors of the opposite
race).
      Although Hispanics in this sample are heavily concentrated in Los Angeles (70 percent of the newly hired
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Hispanics are located there), the finding of low performance ratings for Hispanic men is not unique to Los
Angeles; if anything, the negative difference-in-differences estimates for Hispanic men in Los Angeles were
somewhat smaller than those in other cities.
of white males in similar firms. On the other hand, the performance ratings of Hispanic males at these
firms are significantly lower.
The estimates in column (3) suggest that the differentials between each group of women or
minorities and white men in firms that do not use Affirmative Action are similar to the differentials in
firms that use Affirmative Action. But the estimates in column (2) also indicate that similar
differentials exist between these groups of women or minorities hired at the two types of firms. As a
result, the difference-in-differences estimates in column (4) are quite similar to those in column (1); the
only difference is that the relative performance of black females hired in firms using Affirmative
Action is now more strongly positive. The evidence is very similar in Panel B, when the more extensive
set of controls is added.
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Thus, the evidence for Hispanics tells a relatively consistent story, especially for the men. We
generally find that Hispanic men and women hired under Affirmative Action are less qualified in terms
of education; and the men are matched to less demanding jobs and get worse performance ratings.  On
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the other hand, while we find some evidence that blacks are less qualified in terms of education, we37
      When we add these performance measures to the current wage equations in Table 7, we generally find that
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they generate positive and significant effects on wages. But the various race/gender differentials presented there
are little changed by their inclusion. On one hand, this suggests that the relatively higher wages paid to women
and minorities hired under Affirmative Action may reflect preferential treatment. On the other hand, these results
are based on using the performance ratings as an independent variable; the presumed measurement error in these
ratings inhibits our ability to ask whether performance ratings explain these higher wages.
      One potential problem with the standardized performance ratings is that when we look at a worker hired by a
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firm using Affirmative Action, the typical rating that is subtracted may also apply to an Affirmative Action hire.
In this case, the standardization may erase any relative differences in performance between Affirmative Action
and non-Affirmative Action hires, leading the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of Affirmative
Action on performance to be zero. To examine this possibility, we reestimated the equations in Table 8 using the
raw performance ratings. The column (4) estimates using the raw ratings were not generally further from zero
than the corresponding estimates in Table 8, suggesting that standardization does not force the estimated effects
of Affirmative Action to be zero. In fact, the only substantive change was that the relative performance shortfall
of Hispanic men was erased. This occurred because the estimated difference with respect to Hispanic men in
firms not using Affirmative Action fell to zero, in contrast to an estimated difference of -5.94 in Table 8; this
indicates that the typical rating of jobs into which Hispanic men are hired is substantially higher in Affirmative
Action firms, which is a reason to standardize the performance ratings, and stands in contrast to the potential
problem that typical ratings in firms using Affirmative Action are biased toward the ratings of the Affirmative
Action hire to whom the data refer, thus obscuring lower ratings of such hires.
find no such evidence in their performance ratings, which (like their wage and promotion rates) are
relatively higher in these firms than elsewhere. And for white females, who appear to be the primary
beneficiaries of Affirmative Action (in terms of numbers of hires), we find virtually no evidence of
weaker (or stronger) qualifications or performance.
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Disaggregated Results
The above results address average effects for each of the demographic groups considered. But
these averages might mask differences across subgroups within the broader category. We disaggregate
the data set by establishment size, based on the claim by some researchers that Affirmative Action has
different effects at large and small establishments (e.g., Bloch, 1994). Affirmative Action effects may
differ in large and small establishments because establishments of different sizes use different methods
to implement the policy, or because they face different costs of compliance or noncompliance. Table 9
therefore present results for performance ratings, as well as the hiring shifts associated with38
TABLE 9
Results Disaggregated by Establishment Size
                 (Performance Rating – Typical Rating for Job)                  
Effect of Affirmative                     Difference Relative to:                      
Action on Demographic White Male, Same Demo. Group, White Male Difference-in-
Group of Hire AA Hire Non-AA Hire Non-AA Hire Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A.   100 Workers
White female  .37 -1.22 .60 -2.01 1.39
(.15) (2.08) (1.49) (1.60) (2.41)
[ .03]
Black male  .59 4.10 3.77 3.31 4.55
(.24) (3.34) (3.26) (3.09) (3.76)
[.02]
Black female  .32 2.18 1.78 1.39 2.57
(.25) (3.56) (3.43) (3.33) (3.90)
[.003]
Hispanic male  .41 -1.66 -3.12 -2.44 -2.33
(.28) (3.79) (3.47) (3.61) (3.91)
[.01]
Hispanic female  .21 -1.31 -2.50 -2.10 -1.71
(.30) (4.07) (4.12) (3.91) (4.51)
[-.004]
B. > 100 Workers
White female -.22 -.55 .51 7.23 -7.27
(.25) (2.40) (2.23) (2.76) (3.74)
[.04]
Black male -.31 -.80 -2.63 6.97 -10.41
(.32) (3.71) (3.68) (3.81) (4.84)
[.002]
Black female  -.98 9.95 8.39 17.72 .61
(.33) (3.92) (3.77) (4.07) (4.88)
[-.06]
Hispanic male  -.64 -5.33 -10.25 2.44 -18.03
(.38) (3.86) (3.49) (4.02) (4.69)
[-.04]
Hispanic female  -.67 -1.92 1.54 5.86 -6.24
(.37) (4.13) (4.07) (4.31) (5.05)
[-.03]
Note: Estimates in column (1) correspond to those in column (2 ) of Table 2. Estimates in columns (2)–(5) correspond to
those in Panel B of Table 7. In Panel A, there are 1,643 observations in column (1), and 1,476 in columns (2)–(5). The
corresponding sample sizes for Panel B are 876 and 658. See note to Tables 2 and 7 for more details.39
      This qualitative result did not change if we included measures of the percentage of applicants in each
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demographic group, for the subsample and for the subset of demographic groups (black males, black females, and
Hispanics) for whom these measures are available. However, these data on applicants are probably very noisy,
because they are firm-wide, and do not refer specifically to the job in which the recent hire occurred.
Affirmative Action, breaking down the results for establishments with less than (or equal to) 100 and
more than 100 workers.
The estimates in column (1) parallel the multinomial logit estimates in column (2  ) of Table 2
of the association of Affirmative Action hiring with the demographic group of the worker hired. In
Panel A, which looks at small establishments, the results largely parallel those in Table 2, as the only
significant associations are a higher likelihood that a white female or black male is hired. In Panel B, in
contrast, which looks at large establishments, the largest effects appear to be negative associations with
the likelihood of hiring black females or Hispanics.
To some extent, this reflects the tendency of large firms to hire minorities (especially blacks) in
large numbers regardless of their use of Affirmative Action (Holzer, 1996b). There are also some
differences in observable characteristics between large firms that use Affirmative Action and those that
do not. In particular, large establishments using Affirmative Action are more likely to be in the service
sector, while those not using Affirmative Action have a greater tendency to be in wholesale and retail
trade and to be located in central cities. In addition, application rates from blacks and Hispanics are
relatively higher in firms not using Affirmative Action. Thus, it does not appear that Affirmative
Action boosts the hiring of women or minorities relatively more in large than in small establishments;
in fact, the opposite may even be the case, as the estimated effect of Affirmative Action on the
probability that a white male is hired is actually positive in large establishments.
54
The results for performance ratings, in columns (2)–(5), are quite striking. In particular, the
difference-in-differences estimates provide some evidence that in large establishments (over 100
workers) women and minorities hired under Affirmative Action receive lower performance ratings than40
      Since the survey respondent was identified as the person who had hired the last worker, it is likely to be the
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owner or manager in small- and medium-sized companies; this person should also be able to speak
knowledgeably about a worker’s job performance. In large companies, these functions are more likely to be
separated, perhaps suggesting more error in the performance measures for these observations. However, at least
insofar as the measurement error is random, this cannot explain the large differentials in establishments
employing more than 100 workers.
      This finding speaks to a potential source of bias in the estimation of equation (1) when we look at
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performance ratings. If firms that adopt Affirmative Action by choice tend to be those that are favorably disposed
towards women or minorities, we might expect higher ratings of women or minorities in such firms, leading to a
positive correlation between the error term and the DAA interactions. We would expect this problem to be more
severe in small establishments, where the use of Affirmative Action is more likely to be voluntary. Although this
source of bias would lead us to expect larger recorded performance shortfalls for women and minorities hired
under Affirmative Action in large establishments, we would expect this to act through higher ratings for women
or minorities in small establishments using Affirmative Action, rather than through lower ratings for white males
in large establishments not using Affirmative Action, as we find here. Thus, it appears that we have to consider
other explanations of the differences in results by size of establishment.
      If we make the sample of large establishments bigger by choosing a smaller size cut-off (such as 50), the
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negative performance differentials fall and become insignificant for all groups except Hispanic males.
white men hired into similar firms, the differentials being significant for white females, black males,
and Hispanic males (for whom the effect is quite large, equal to about one standard deviation of the
standardized performance rating).
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Note, however, that the lower relative performance ratings of women and minorities in large
establishments using Affirmative Action do not appear in any of the simple differences (with the
exception of Hispanic males in column (3)); in fact, most are positive, and with the exception of
Hispanic males, all are small. This occurs because the relative differences stem from the lower ratings
for white men in non-Affirmative Action firms (column (3)), rather than lower ratings for women and
minorities in firms using Affirmative Action (column (1)).
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In addition, we emphasize that recent hires into these large establishments represent less than
one-third of the total sample, and for most demographic groups the results are reversed in small
establishments, although the differentials are smaller.  Thus, for most women and minorities, job
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performance relative to white males is roughly the same whether or not Affirmative Action is used in
hiring.41
V. CONCLUSION
We use micro-level data on employers and employees to investigate whether minority or
female employees hired under Affirmative Action procedures are less qualified, relative to other groups
of workers. Our measures of qualifications include educational attainment of the workers hired (in
absolute levels and relative to job requirements), skill requirements on the job, and a variety of outcome
measures that presumably are linked to worker performance on the job. The analysis is based on data
from a new survey of over 3,200 employers in four major metropolitan areas in the United States.
On average, we find some evidence that minority employees hired under Affirmative Action
have lower educational attainment and are somewhat more likely to fall short of formal educational
“requirements” on these jobs when they are hired, although we find no such evidence for white females
hired under Affirmative Action. However, for blacks the shortfalls in education of workers hired at
firms using Affirmative Action are not much larger than those at firms not using Affirmative Action.
We speculate that the perception that Affirmative Action leads to preferential treatment of
women and minorities is based on a simple comparison of these groups with white men in firms using
Affirmative Action. In these firms, it is not inaccurate for critics of Affirmative Action to assert that
women or minorities are less qualified (in terms of education) than white men. However, the
difference-in-differences analysis suggests that this shortfall to some extent reflects an economy wide
shortfall in educational attainment among minorities. That is, the gap in qualifications in the firms or
sector using Affirmative Action does not necessarily imply that Affirmative Action is responsible for
the gap; our evidence suggests that, to a large extent, it is not.
When we consider measures of outcomes for workers in these jobs, we find that minorities and
females hired under Affirmative Action do relatively well. On average, their wages are relatively
higher than those not hired under Affirmative Action, as are their probabilities of promotion. But since
these outcomes might themselves be driven by Affirmative Action policies, and not just by the42
performance of the workers, we also consider employers’ ratings of employee performance as an
additional outcome measure. These measures are subjective, and comparisons across employers and
jobs are likely to be plagued by considerable noise and by the lack of a uniform standard; we therefore
adjust the ratings for the employer’s rating of the “typical” worker in the same job. The results show
that ratings of white female or black employees in firms using Affirmative Action are generally at least
as high as those of other comparable workers. These results are reversed only for Hispanic men, who
receive significantly lower performance ratings (although this finding must be tempered by the fact that
Affirmative Action does not appear to boost the hiring of Hispanic men in this sample).
Taken together, the results of this paper suggest that critics of Affirmative Action may be right
in pointing to some shortfalls in qualifications among women or minorities hired under Affirmative
Action. However, these critics may be focusing too narrowly on one or two easily observable measures
of qualifications that are not the only predictors of what is ultimately the most important measure—job
performance. Our results suggest that most women or minorities hired under Affirmative Action make
up in some way—presumably through qualifications or skills other than those measures we
observe—for the educational shortfalls in qualifications that we find. Thus, there may be some
redistribution of employment away from white males towards minorities and females at firms using
Affirmative Action, but there does not appear to be substitution of less able women or minority workers
for more able white male workers.
When we disaggregate our sample by establishment size, we find some evidence that in large
establishments (over 100 workers) women and minorities hired under Affirmative Action are relatively
less qualified and receive lower performance ratings than white men hired into similar firms. However,
we do not attach too much importance to these results for a number of reasons: recent hires into these
large establishments represent less than one-third of the total sample; for most demographic groups the
results are reversed in small establishments (although the differentials are smaller); the relatively larger43
gap between women or minorities and white males in firms using Affirmative Action is driven by
lower ratings of the latter in non-Affirmative Action firms, rather than lower ratings of the former in
Affirmative Action firms; and Affirmative Action does not appear to boost hiring of women or
minorities in the large establishments in our data set. 
Therefore, we interpret the overall evidence as indicating that most groups of women and
minorities hired under Affirmative Action perform their jobs roughly as well relative to white men as do
those hired in firms that do not use Affirmative Action. The average effects indicated by the full sample
results—which arguably are most relevant to evaluating the effects of the policy—support the
conclusion that there is essentially no performance shortfall among most groups of women and
minorities hired under Affirmative Action.
This does not necessarily imply that there are no costs to the use of Affirmative Action. One
possibility is that these firms hire relatively more less-skilled workers than they would in the absence of
Affirmative Action, which might entail some cost in efficiency. Another is that the same number of
less-skilled workers are hired as before, but that there is relatively more redistribution of employment
away from less-skilled white males within these firms. Without panel data on firms both before and
after their use of these procedures, it is impossible to distinguish among these interpretations.
We should also note a number of further warnings with respect to these findings. Given the data
that we have, we are only able to estimate the effects of Affirmative Action on the last worker hired in
each firm, which is not necessarily a representative sample of all employees hired under these
procedures. We are also not able to compare different hires into comparable jobs within each firm. The
focus on recent hires also forces us to consider only short-term outcomes for a sample of employees
with very low job tenure. Finally, our self-reported measure of use of Affirmative Action may not
allow us to define the relevant set of firms or activities as clearly as in those studies that use more44
objective measures, such as federal contractor status (although we have argued that our measure
appears to mimic more objective measures quite well, and could conceivably be preferable).
Despite these reservations, we believe that our data provide useful information on the effects of
Affirmative Action, by providing the first micro-level evidence linking Affirmative Action to worker
qualifications and performance. We interpret the data as indicating that, for the most part, Affirmative
Action does not lead to the hiring of minorities or women with substantially lower qualifications or
weaker job performance. 45
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